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 The post-2006 collapse in the U.S. housing market led to a 35% drop in house prices and 
an increase in mortgage delinquency rate that reached over 10% in 2009 (Figure 1). Mortgage 
contracts give lenders the right to foreclose on a home if the homeowner defaults on his payment 
obligations. However, when a major shock hits the economy and millions of homeowners default 
simultaneously default, the fire sale of foreclosed homes can lead to a further reduction in house 
prices and threatens real activity such as residential investment and consumer demand.1  
This paper investigates the effect of foreclosures on house prices and real activity during 
the recent Great Recession. The question is important for understanding the transmission and 
amplification of financial shocks into the real economy. However, isolating the causal effect of 
foreclosures is difficult because of omitted variables and reverse causality. The latter effect is 
especially important: a homeowner will only allow a foreclosure to occur if he or she is 
underwater on their mortgage. As a result, house price declines will be strongly correlated with 
foreclosures even if foreclosures have no direct effect on house prices. 
In this paper we attempt to estimate the causal effect of foreclosures on economic 
outcomes by taking advantage of differences in state laws in the foreclosure process. In 
particular, some states require that a foreclosed sale must take place through the courts (judicial 
foreclosure states). In these states, a lender must sue a borrower in court before conducting an 
auction to sell the property – a lengthy and costly process. Other states do not have such a 
requirement (non-judicial foreclosure states) and give lenders the automatic right to sell the 
delinquent property after providing only a notice of sale to the borrower. As first highlighted in 
the economics literature by Pence (2006), the 21 states that require judicial foreclosure impose 
substantial costs and time on lenders seeking to foreclose on a house. 
                                                
1 Models that emphasize amplification of shocks from the leverage-induced forced sale of durable goods include 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krishnamurthy (2003, 2009), and Lorenzoni (2008) 
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 Do legal differences in foreclosure laws effect the propensity to foreclose on a home? We 
find that the answer is a resounding yes. States with non-judicial foreclosure laws are twice as 
likely to foreclose on a delinquent home. For example, there are 2.3 foreclosures per homeowner 
with a mortgage in the 2008-09 period in judicial states versus 4.7 in non-judicial states. This 
large difference in foreclosure rate exists despite essentially identical mortgage default rates in 
judicial and non-judicial states (9.2% and 9.6% respectively).  
Zip code level analysis provides additional evidence on the differences in foreclosure 
rates between judicial and non-judicial states. Using zip code level data and focusing on zip 
codes near the border of two states with different foreclosure laws, we find a sharp discontinuous 
jump in foreclosure propensity for zip codes located on the non-judicial side of the state border. 
Moreover, using separate zip code level data on MLS listings we show that housing inventory 
also “jumps” when one crosses into a non-judicial state. 
 The higher foreclosure rate in non-judicial states is also highly persistent. Both state level 
and state-border discontinuity analysis shows that for five straight years – from 2007 through 
2011 (the end of our sample period) – foreclosure rates in non-judicial states remain much 
higher. In other words, the higher foreclosure rate in non-judicial states is not a short-run 
phenomenon. In sum, higher foreclosure rates in non-judicial states directly translate into higher 
housing supply in the market and this expansion in housing supply lasts at least five years.  
Does the higher rate of foreclosures and for-sale inventory in non-judicial states translate 
into a steeper decline in house prices? We can answer this question using state foreclosure laws 
as an instrument for the incidence of foreclosures. State foreclosure laws provide a compelling 
instrument: not only do they strongly predict foreclosures, but they are also uncorrelated with 
other variables that might directly impact the foreclosure rate. 
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In particular, state level analysis shows that there are no significant differences between 
judicial and non-judicial states in mortgage defaults, house price growth from 2002 to 2005, 
level of house prices in 2005, leverage or debt-to-income growth from 2002 to 2005, fraction 
subprime, income, pre-crisis unemployment rate, racial mix, poverty, or education. Similarly the 
sharp discontinuity in zip code level analysis exists only in foreclosure propensity: there is no 
equivalent jump in other zip code level attributes including credit scores, income, race, 
education, default rate or 2002-05 house price growth.2  
Using state foreclosure law as an instrument for foreclosures, we estimate the causal 
effect of foreclosures on house prices and find a large effect. Moving from the median to the 90th 
percentile of the foreclosure per homeowner distribution leads to eight percentage point lower 
house price growth from 2007 to 2009. Our back of the envelope calculation suggests that the 
foreclosure-induced increase in supply of housing can plausibly explain the entire house price 
effect of foreclosures. For example, our estimates imply that a persistent foreclosure-induced 
increase of 12.6% in the supply of housing in non-judicial states decreased house prices by 5.3 
percentage points. 
Does the foreclosure-induced reduction in house prices lead to a reduction in real activity 
as well? A significant drop in house prices deteriorates the balance sheet of all households in the 
neighborhood and threatens to reduce residential investment and consumer demand (see Mian, 
Rao, and Sufi (2012) and Mian and Sufi (2012a) for related evidence). Using foreclosure law as 
an instrument, we find that a one standard deviation increase in foreclosures per homeowner 
                                                
2 We also analyze at length any ex-ante differences in availability of credit between judicial and non-judicial states, 
and find no significant differences during the credit boom years of 2001-2005. See section III for further discussion. 
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leads to a 1/2 to 2/3 standard deviation decrease in permits for new residential construction and a 
2/3 to 1 standard deviation decline in auto sales.3 
We use our microeconomic estimates to quantify the aggregate effects of foreclosure on 
the macro-economy. From 2007 to 2009, our estimates suggest that foreclosures were 
responsible for 20 to 30% of the decline in house prices, 15 to 25% of the decline in residential 
investment, and 20 to 35% of the decline in auto sales over the same period. The details of this 
calculation are in Section V. 
While our paper finds strong effect of foreclosures on house prices and real activity, we 
do not take a stand on whether foreclosures help to bring house prices, durable consumption, or 
residential investment closer to or further from their-long-run socially efficient levels. For 
example, in the absence of foreclosures, house prices may display downward rigidity given loss 
aversion (Genesove and Mayer (2001)). Alternatively, house prices may be kept above their 
socially efficient level by government support. But our estimates suggest that foreclosures lead to 
more abrupt declines in these outcomes than would be observed in the absence of foreclosures, 
and these declines are likely to be more painful in the midst of a severe recession. This is 
consistent with the amplification mechanisms emphasized in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and 
Krishnamurthy (2003).  
Our findings are most closely related to recent studies on foreclosures and house prices 
(Calomiris, et al (2011), Campbell, et al (2010), Foote, et al (2008), Hartley (2010a)). One 
advantage of our study relative to the existing literature is comprehensiveness: our analysis 
covers the entire United States as opposed to one state or one city and we examine foreclosures 
                                                
3 We conduct a number of robustness tests for these results. As a placebo test, we show that non-judicial states did 
not experience a relative decline in durable consumption or residential investment during the 2001 recession when 
foreclosures were negligible. We also show that our results are similar if we exclude Arizona and Nevada, the two 
states with the highest foreclosure rates. Further, our results are similar if we change the classification of some 
states--particularly Massachusetts--based on the legal filing requirement for a foreclosure. See Section VI. 
5 
 
all the way through the end of 2010.4 Relative to these studies, we are the first to examine the 
effect of foreclosures on real economic activity. 
We are also the first to use state laws on judicial requirement for foreclosure to identify 
the effect of foreclosures on house prices. The importance of an instrument for foreclosures is 
mentioned prominently in the literature.5 Further, our results show the powerful effect of the 
legal environment on foreclosure incidence, a fact that is important to know for those designing 
laws related to household defaults. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the data and summary 
statistics. Section II discusses identification and the empirical strategy we employ. Sections III 
and IV present and discuss our main empirical results on house prices, residential investment, 
and durable consumption. Section V provides robustness tests, and Section VI concludes. 
I.  Data and Summary Statistics 
A. Data 
 We use data from a number of sources. Foreclosure data from RealtyTrac.com, one of the 
leading foreclosure listing websites, are available to us at the zip code level at annual frequency 
for 2006 through 2010. RealtyTrac.com collects data from legal documents that are submitted by 
lenders during the foreclosure process. There are five types of filings collected by 
RealtyTrac.com. The first two are filings that are done before a foreclosure auction: a notice of 
default (NOD) and a lis pendens (LIS). Two of the filings are directly associated with a 
foreclosure auction: a notice of trustee sale (NTS) and a notice of foreclosure sale (NFS). 
                                                
4 One important disadvantage is that many of these studies have individual level data on foreclosures and house 
prices, whereas we have only zip code level data. 
5 As Campbell, et al (2010) note, “…foreclosures are endogenous to house prices because homeowners are more 
likely to default if they have negative equity, which is more likely as house prices fall. Ideally, we would like an 
instrument that influences foreclosures but that does not influence house price except through foreclosures; however, 
we have not been able to find such an instrument” (15). We find that the unconditional OLS estimate of the effect of 
foreclosures on house prices is 50% larger than 2SLS estimate. 
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Finally, RealtyTrac.com collects information on whether the foreclosed home is purchased by 
the lender at auction, or real-estate owned (REO). 
 For every zip code, we have the total number of filings for each of these five categories. 
To avoid double-counting filings for the same property, RealtyTrac.com provided us totals for 
the last filing in the process for a given property in a given year. For example, if a borrower 
received a notice of default and a notice of trustee sale in the same year, RealtyTrac.com records 
one notice of trustee sale for the property. 
 The term "foreclosure" requires some additional definition. The foreclosure process is 
initiated when a lender files a pre-auction filing (i.e., a lis pendens or a notice of default). 
However, these filings on their own do not represent a foreclosure. A pre-auction filing does not 
by itself lead to a sale or an eviction, and it does not necessarily mean the house will be acquired 
or sold by the lender. Instead, a foreclosure represents the forced sale of a property by the lender 
for the purpose of reimbursing the claim. This is best measured by the filing that directly 
precedes the auction itself. As a result, our measure of total foreclosures in a zip code is the total 
number of notices of trustee sale, foreclosure sales, or real estate owned (NTS+NFS+REO).6 
 Data on house prices at the zip code-quarter level are from Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss and 
Zillow.com. An excellent description of the differences and similarities between FCSW and 
Zillow.com is available in the appendix of Guerrieri, et al (2010). New residential permit data is 
from the Census and is available at the county-annual level. Auto sales data are from R.L. Polk 
and are available at the county-monthly frequency. For more information on the R.L. Polk data, 
see Mian and Sufi (2012b). 
                                                
6  We are grateful to Tyler White for providing us with information on the foreclosure data from RealtyTrac.com. 
Readers interested in acquiring the foreclosure data should contact tyler.white@realtytrac.com.  
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 We supplement foreclosure, house price, residential investment, and auto sales data with 
zip code-quarterly level information on delinquencies from Equifax.7 The Equifax data also 
allow us to measure at the zip code level the fraction of borrowers that had credit scores below 
660 as of 2000. Finally, we supplement the zip code level data with demographic information 
from the 2000 Decennial Census. 
 Given the availability of variables at different levels of geographic aggregation, we 
construct final data sets at the state, CBSA, and zip code level. The underlying zip code level 
data covers approximately 31,000 zip codes, which represent the entire United States. Zip codes 
are matched to states, counties, and CBSAs using a data set from zip-codes.com. 
The main restriction on the data is the availability of zip code house price indices. 
Zillow.com zip code level house price data are available for 8,900 zip codes in our sample, and 
FCSW house price data are available for 4,199 zip codes. Zip code level data are available from 
one of these two sources for 9,213 zip codes. These zip codes represent 65% of the total U.S. 
population, 81% of total home-related debt as of 2005, and 83% of total foreclosures in 2008 and 
2009. By far the largest observable difference between zip codes for which we do and do not 
have data is whether the zip code is in an urban area. Almost 80% of zip codes for which we 
have house price data available are in urban areas; only 19% of zip codes for which we do not 
have house price data are in urban areas. 
B. Summary Statistics 
The top panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics of the state level data used in the 
analysis. The average number of foreclosures per homeowner in 2008 and 2009 is 0.037. The 
number of homeowners is approximated using the number of mortgage accounts as of 2005 
according to Equifax. The number of 60 days past due delinquent mortgage or home equity 
                                                
7 See Mian and Sufi (2009) and Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) for more information on the Equifax data. 
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accounts per homeowners is 0.095, which implies an average pass-through from delinquency to 
foreclosure close to 40%. 
Data on house prices and residential investment show the dramatic turn of events starting 
in 2006 and 2007. From 2007 to 2009, house prices dropped by 10 to 20% depending on the data 
source. Residential investment at the state level dropped by 80% as measured by the Census data 
on permits for new residential construction. Auto sales dropped by 41%. 
Table 1 also presents summary statistics at the CBSA level. The patterns in foreclosures, 
delinquencies, house price growth, residential investment growth, and auto sales growth are 
similar. Table 1 also contains information on other important variables, including the increase in 
the debt to income ratio from 2002 to 2005, the fraction of consumers that were subprime 
borrowers as of 2000, and the unemployment rate as of 2000. 
II. State Foreclosure Laws And Propensity To Foreclose 
 Since we are interested in estimating the impact of foreclosures on house prices and real 
activity, we need an instrument that changes foreclosure propensity across otherwise similar 
neighborhoods. One possible candidate for such an instrument is the difference in state laws that 
determines the ease with which a lender may foreclose on a property.8 We discuss this difference 
below. 
A. Judicial Versus Non-Judicial Foreclosure States 
The ease with which a lender can sell a delinquent property through foreclosure depends 
on the laws governing a particular state. There are two types of foreclosure laws – Judicial and 
Non-judicial - prevalent in states across the U.S. Lenders in states with a judicial foreclosure 
requirement must file a notice with a judge providing evidence regarding the amount of the debt, 
                                                
8 General information on the foreclosure process presented in this section comes from Pence (2003, 2006), 
http://www.all-foreclosure.com/judicial.htm, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreclosure, and 
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2007/04/foreclosure-sales-and-reo-for-ubernerds.html.  
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the delinquency of the debt, and why the delinquency should allow the lender to sell the 
property. This filing is typically called a lis pendens. The borrower is notified of the filing and 
has a chance to respond. If the court finds that the lender is accurate in their claim, a property 
will move to the auction stage of the process. 
In a non-judicial foreclosure, the lender does not need court approval to auction a 
property. Lenders use rights that they have obtained in the original mortgage document allowing 
sale of the property if the borrower is delinquent on the account. In a non-judicial foreclosure, a 
lender sends a notice of default to the borrower, and the notice is typically also filed with the 
jurisdiction authority (i.e., county, municipality, etc.).9 If the borrower fails to pay the debt or 
dispute the notice, a notice of sale is subsequently filed which begins the auction process. 
A large body of evidence suggests that costs to lenders are substantially higher for 
judicial versus non-judicial foreclosures (Wood (1997), Ciochetti (1997), Pence (2003), 
Pennington-Cross (2004)). Websites covering the mechanics of foreclosure frequently cite that 
judicial foreclosures are expensive for lenders. For example, a reputable blog 
calculatedriskblog.com writes: “Non-judicial foreclosure is almost always faster and cheaper for 
the lender than a judicial foreclosure.” 10 The October 2010 temporary foreclosure moratorium 
by JPMorgan-Chase, GMAC, and Bank of America highlights the costs to lender in states that 
require judicial foreclosure. Given problems with the verification of documents, these servicers 
temporarily stopped foreclosure activity in states that require judicial foreclosure.11 
 Figure 2 shows the variation across U.S. states in classification of foreclosure laws, with 
judicial foreclosure states shaded in dark gray. The classification of states comes from 
                                                
9 According to RealtyTrac, there are 16 non-judicial states that do not require a notice of default before the auction 
filing. See the appendix for more information. 
10 http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2007/04/foreclosure-sales-and-reo-for-ubernerds.html 
11 See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/business/08frozen.html . 
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RealtyTrac.com. While the majority of states that require judicial foreclosure are located in the 
upper Midwest and Northeast, there is geographical variation outside this area as well.  
 There is a certain degree of subjectivity in the classification of state laws requiring 
judicial approval for a foreclosure. We follow RealtyTrac for the following reasons. First, the 
information from RealtyTrac is publicly available, concrete, and justified--we have no ability to 
manipulate the classification and other researchers can examine the precise reasons for the 
classification at RealtyTrac's website.12  Second, RealtyTrac specializes in the collection of legal 
filings on foreclosures and our data on foreclosures are from RealtyTrac; it is therefore natural to 
use their classification of foreclosure laws. Nonetheless, we perform an extensive set of 
robustness checks using alternative classifications of state foreclosure laws in Section V and the 
Appendix.  
B. Do Foreclosure Laws Effect Foreclosure Propensity? 
Do state laws influence the rate of foreclosure? Figure 3 shows that the answer is a 
resounding yes. The left panel plots the foreclosures per delinquent account ratio for every state. 
States shaded in black require judicial foreclosure. The foreclosure rate in non-judicial states is 
clearly much higher. The 13 states with the highest foreclosure to delinquent account ratios all 
allow non-judicial foreclosure. Of the 22 states with the highest pass-through rate from 
delinquencies to foreclosures, only 1 requires judicial foreclosure.  
The right panel of Figure 3 plots foreclosures per homeowner against delinquencies per 
homeowner. Judicial states are plotted as triangles, and non-judicial states are plotted as circles. 
Consistent with the left panel, non-judicial states convert defaults into foreclosures at a much 
higher rate (gradient of 0.77 versus 0.35 for judicial states). 
                                                
12 See http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp.  
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Panel A of Table 2 runs the formal first stage of foreclosure laws on the propensity to 
foreclose. We regress foreclosures on an indicator variable for whether the state requires judicial 
foreclosure. Column 1 shows that states with a judicial foreclosure requirement have a 
foreclosure per homeowner-with-a-mortgage ratio in 2008 and 2009 that is 0.024 lower than the 
foreclosure per homeowner ratio of 0.047 in non-judicial states. Thus foreclosure rates are twice 
as high in non-judicial states compared to judicial states. 
The higher foreclosure rate in non-judicial states is not driven by higher default rates. 
Column (2) shows that default rates in 2008 and 2009 are not statistically different between 
judicial and non-judicial states. Hence including default rate in column (3) to the regression in 
column (1) does not change the coefficient on judicial law dummy. Column (4) regresses 
foreclosures per delinquent account on the foreclosure law dummy. As already seen in Figure 3, 
foreclosures per delinquent account are twice as high in non-judicial states compared to judicial 
states. 
Figure 3 and Table 2 illustrate the remarkable impact of foreclosure laws on the 
propensity to foreclose. Foreclosure rates in non-judicial states are twice as high as in judicial 
states despite having the same level of mortgage defaults on average. Our analysis focused on 
2008 and 2009, and commuted the total number of foreclosures over this period since these years 
represent the heart of the housing crisis. However, our underlying data on foreclosures is at an 
annual frequency and covers the period 2006 to 2011.  
Panel B of Table 2 regresses foreclosures per homeowner on judicial foreclosure dummy 
and default per home owner separately for each year. The difference between judicial and non-
judicial foreclosure rates increases sharply in 2008 and 2009 and remains elevated until the end 
of our sample period in 2011. The impact of foreclosure laws on foreclosure propensity is not 
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only strong but highly persistent – lasting for at least four straight years (2008 to 2011). 
Consequently the effect of foreclosure laws should not be seen as temporary or relevant only in 
the short run. 
C. Are Judicial and Non-judicial States Systematically Different? 
One potential concern with the evidence in Figure 3 and Table 2 could be that states with 
non-judicial foreclosure laws and higher levels of foreclosure are possibly different on other 
important dimensions. For example, higher foreclosure rates in non-judicial states may have 
nothing to do with state laws if non-judicial states also happen to have more subprime borrowers. 
In other words, for foreclosure laws to be a legitimate instrument, we need to convince ourselves 
of the exclusion restriction: judicial and non-judicial states do not differ along another attribute 
that independently influences the foreclosure rate.  
We have already seen in column (2) of Table 2, Panel A that there is no significant 
difference in the initial impact of mortgage defaults in judicial and non-judicial states. This result 
is heartening as any differences in borrower attributes between judicial and non-judicial states 
should have translated into systematically different default rates in the two types of states. 
Table 3 tests if other relevant characteristics are different across judicial and non-judicial 
states by regressing each characteristic on a dummy for judicial foreclosure law. We use an 
exhaustive list of fifteen different variables, including delinquencies per homeowner in 2006 and 
2009, growth in house prices from 2002 to 2005, level of house prices in 2005, leverage or debt 
to income growth between 2002 and 2005, fraction of consumers that are subprime in 2000 (i.e. 
have a credit score below 660), level of income in 2005, unemployment rate in 2000, fraction 
below poverty, fraction black and Hispanic, fraction with less than high school education and 
fraction that lives in urban areas.  
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Remarkably none of the aforementioned variables are significantly different across 
judicial and non-judicial states, and the estimated standard errors are reasonably tight. For every 
variable except FCSW house price growth (for which the sample is only 24 states), we can reject 
at the 10% level of confidence that judicial requirement states are different by a 3/4 standard 
deviation. We can thus be reasonably confident that otherwise similar states differ in their 
foreclosure laws, probably due to historical factors unrelated to contemporary economic 
conditions.  
D. State-Border Discontinuity Test for the Effect of State Laws on Foreclosures 
We provide additional evidence on the legitimacy of the judicial foreclosure requirement 
instrument based on a state-border discontinuity design. The discontinuity test uses much finer 
zip code level data on foreclosures and tests if foreclosure rates are significantly different in zip 
codes across state borders that differ in their foreclosure laws.  
In order to conduct this analysis, we focus on zip codes that are close to the border of two 
states that differ in whether judicial foreclosures are required. Table 4 lists the state borders that 
are included in the border analysis, along with the number of zip codes within 25 and 10 miles of 
the border.  
Using this sample, we ask the following question: as one moves from a judicial state into 
a non-judicial state, does the foreclosure rate “jump” at the border? Under the assumption (which 
we test) that zip codes on either side of the border are otherwise similar, the only change that 
happens when one crosses the border is the change in state laws applicable to delinquent 
mortgages. 
Formally, we estimate the following specification: 
ܨܱܴܥܮܱܷܴܵܧܴܣܶܧ௭௕௦௫ ൌ ߙ௕௦௫ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܦ௭௕௦௫௜ହ଴௜ୀିହ଴ ൅ ߝ௭௕௦௫  (1) 
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where ܨܱܴܥܮܱܷܴܵܧܥܴܣܶܧ௭௕௦௫ represents foreclosures per delinquent account for zip code z that 
is located within 50 miles of border b in state s, and lies on a 10-mile broad strip x of the border. 
The 10-mile broad strips are constructed such that they run perpendicular to the direction of the 
state-border. The specification includes fixed effects at the level of border-state times 10-mile 
strips (ߙ௕௦௫). These fixed effects ensure that we compare zip codes that lie on the same 10-mile 
broad strip running across the state border in question.13  
The dots in Figure 4 represent the coefficient estimates of ߛ௜ on the indicators ܦ௭௕௦௫௜, 
which are indicators for each one mile on either side of the border, with negative values being in 
the state that requires judicial foreclosure. These coefficient estimates represent the average 
foreclosures per delinquent account ratio for one mile wide bands around the border of a judicial 
state and non-judicial foreclosure state, after controlling for (border state*10 mile strip) fixed 
effects. 
 Figure 4 plots the estimates of ߛ௜for the foreclosures per delinquent account for 2006 
through 2011. Consistent with the state level analysis in Figure 3, there is a very sharp jump in 
the foreclosure to delinquent account ratio as one crosses the border from a judicial requirement 
state into a non-judicial requirement state. The difference in the foreclosure rate increases in 
2008 and 2009, and remains persistently high even into 2011.  
 One can formally test for a jump at state borders in the foreclosure rate by estimating a 
modified version of equation (1) that allows for foreclosure rate to vary flexibly – but 
continuously – with distance from border, and tests for a jump at the border. Formally this 
translates into estimating the equation:   
                                                
13 The 10 mile strip indicator variables control non-parametrically for omitted variables among zip codes that are 
close to one another and equidistant from the border. These are important given that some states border one another 
in very different geographical areas. 
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ܨܱܴܥܮܱܷܴܵܧܴܣܶܧ௭௕௦௫ ൌ ߙ௕௦௫ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܦܫܵ ௭ܶ௕௦௫ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶܵܳ௭௕௦௫ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܦܫܵܶܥܷܤܧ௭௕௦௫ ൅
ߚସ ∗ ܬܷܦܫܥܫܣܮ௦ ൅ ߝ௭௕௦௫          (2) 
ܦܫܵܶ represents the distance in miles of a zip code from state-border, with distance in judicial 
states represented by a negative number. DISTSQ and DISTCUBE represent squared and cubic terms of 
this distance variable. The polynomial specification allows foreclosure rate to vary in a flexible non-linear 
fashion. The coefficient ߚସ on JUDICIAL dummy tests for any discontinuity at the state border. We 
estimate equation (2) separately for each year from 2006 through 2011. The standard errors are clustered 
at the state-border level, with 40 total clusters.  
The coefficients are reported in Panel A of Table 5. The number of zip codes in each regression 
varies by year because the dependent variable is not defined for zip code with zero mortgages in default. 
The results show that the jump in foreclosure rate at the state border is small and not statistically 
significant at the 10% level in 2006. However, it quickly increases in magnitude and remains 
large and statistically significant from 2007 through 2011 – as seen in Figure 4 as well. 
While foreclosure propensity jumps at the border, there is no such pattern in other 
economic and social attributes. Figure 5 estimates equation (1) for alternative outcomes 
including delinquency rate, subprime share, income, poverty incidence, minority share, and 
education. The plots show that there is no discernible jump in any of these variables at the 
border.    
III. The Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Inventory And House Prices: A 2SLS Approach 
 The preceding section shows that non-judicial foreclosure laws double the propensity to 
foreclose despite judicial and non-judicial states being very similar along all other dimensions. 
Evidence supporting the legitimacy of the instrument was provided by the state-border 
discontinuity analysis. As a result, we estimate the effect of foreclosures on house prices and real 
activity using the following two stage least squares specification: 
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ܮ݊൫ܻ2009௚௦൯ െ ܮ݊൫ܻ2007௚௦൯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݈݁ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ݏ0809௚௦෣ ൅ Γ ∗ ௚ܺ௦ ൅ ߝ௚௦  (3) 
ܨ݋ݎ݈݁ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ݏ0809௚௦ ൌ ߨ ൅ ߠ ∗ ܬݑ݈݀݅ܿ݅ܽܨ݋ݎ݈݁ܿ݋ݏݑݎܴ݁݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௦ ൅ Λ ∗ ௚ܺ௦ ൅ ߟ௚௦  (4) 
 
Equation (4) represents the first stage. We regress foreclosures in 2008 and 2009 scaled 
by the number of homeowners with a mortgage as of 2005 in geographical unit g (which can be a 
state or CBSA) on an indicator variable for whether the geographical unit is in a state s that 
requires judicial foreclosure. If the level of analysis is the state level then the g subscript is 
redundant. The second stage in equation (3) regresses the growth rate in outcome Y in 
geographical unit g from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009 on the predicted value of 
foreclosures from the first stage. Outcomes include real estate listings, house prices, residential 
investment, and auto sales. Control variables are in the matrix X. 
A. Do Foreclosures Lead to a Net Increase in Market Inventory? 
State foreclosure laws have a powerful effect on foreclosure propensity. However, for 
foreclosures to have an effect on house prices it is important that foreclosures lead to a net 
increase in the supply of houses for sale in the market. Is there independent evidence of this in 
the data? If more houses come on the market due to foreclosures, some of the non-distressed 
homeowners might decide not to put their houses for sale on the market. As a result, the 
equilibrium net effect of foreclosures on the supply of housing inventory might be muted.  
We utilize a separate zip code level data set from Target Data Inc that records the number 
of new “for sale” listings  from Multiple Listing Service (MLS) for 2009 and 2010.14 In 2009, 
the fraction of new listings to homeowners is on average 6% across the states in the sample. In 
                                                
14 See http://www.targetdata.net/ for more details. The data for years before 2009 are not available. 
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order to isolate the net supply effect, we use the number of new listings per homeowner as an 
independent variable. 
Column (1) of Panel B in Table 5 shows that the cumulative number of new listings per 
homeowner for sale in 2009 and 2010 is 10.8 percent (-0.0126/0.116) lower in judicial states that 
have lower rates of foreclosure. Column (2) estimates the 2SLS effect of foreclosures on new 
listings and finds that one unit increase in foreclosures per home owner leads to a 0.46 unit 
increase in the number of new listings. Column (3) adds default rate as a control variable and 
results are similar. 
Since the underlying data of new listings is available at the zip code level, we can 
replicate the state-border discontinuity analysis summarized by equation (1) using the number of 
new listings per home owner as the dependent variable. Figure 6 shows that there is strong 
evidence of a sharp increase in listings when one enters the non-judicial state.  
Columns (4) and (5) confirm the statistical significance of the jump. As in panel A, 
standard errors are clustered at the state-border level with 40 borders in total. The number of 
listings jumps by 1.9 and 1.6 percentage points in 2009 and 2010 respectively. These are large 
effects giving that zip code level listings per capita have a mean of 5.1 and 4.8 in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. There is therefore strong and persistent evidence that foreclosures increase the net 
supply of houses on the market. 
While there may be other channels through which foreclosures affect house prices, the 
evidence in this sub-section suggests an important role for the foreclosure-induced expansion in 
the supply of inventory. As we will show below, the very large increase in supply in inventory 
can plausibly explain the entire decline in house prices. This evidence is consistent with Hartley 
(2010) who finds that the supply effect dominates the disamenity effect in most areas.  
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B. The Effect of Foreclosures on House Prices 
 Figure 7 presents the reduced form version of our two-stage least squares estimation. It 
plots house price growth in states with and without a judicial foreclosure requirement from 2004 
onwards. For both the FCSW (top) and Zillow.com (bottom) indices, there is a larger drop in 
house prices in states that do not require judicial foreclosure. The magnitude of the relative 
decline is significantly larger using the FCSW index. For the FCSW index, house prices in non-
judicial states fell by 43% from the middle of 2006 to the beginning of 2009. They fell by only 
28% in judicial states. The top right panel plots the difference over time. The drop using 
Zillow.com from the second quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2009 is about 4%.15 Further, 
there is no systematic evidence of differential house price trends before the foreclosure crisis. 
Finally, the difference in house price growth between the two states moderates in 2010, a result 
we will return to later in this section. 
 Table 6 presents the second stage estimates of the effect of foreclosures on house price 
growth. Columns 1 through 3 focus on house price growth measured by Zillow.com from 2007 
to 2009.  As the estimates show, there is a strong negative effect of foreclosures on house price 
growth.16 The estimates in columns 1 through 3 imply that a one standard deviation increase in 
foreclosures per homeowner in 2008 and 2009 leads to an 5 to 7% relative drop in house price 
growth, which is 2/5 to 3/5 a standard deviation decrease in house price growth. The estimate in 
column 1 implies that moving from the state with median foreclosure rate to a state with the 90th 
percentile foreclosure rate leads to 8% lower house price growth from 2007 to 2009. 
                                                
15 In Appendix Figure 1, we replicate Figure 7 using publicly available data from the FHFA and the S&P Case 
Shiller 20 MSA indices. The results are qualitatively similar. 
16For both Zillow and FCSW,  the 2SLS estimate of the effect of foreclosures on house prices conditional on 
delinquencies is slightly larger than the OLS correlation conditional on delinquencies. If we do not condition on 
delinquencies in either the OLS or the 2SLS (unreported), the OLS coefficient increases sharply and is 50% larger 
than the 2SLS coefficient. This is consistent with a bias in the OLS that overstates the negative effect of foreclosures 
on house prices. 
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 The inclusion of control variables does not have a large effect on the magnitude of the 
estimates.  These results are consistent with evidence in Section II that states with and without 
judicial foreclosure requirement are similar on observable characteristics. The estimates are 
similar for the FCSW house price measure. The statistical power is weaker, especially in column 
6, given that FCSW data is available for only 24 states in the sample. 
 In Table 7, we replicate the specifications using CBSA level data. While the variation in 
judicial requirement for foreclosures in the first stage is at the state level, the CBSA level-
analysis allows us to control for other characteristics at a more granular level. The estimates 
imply a negative effect of foreclosures on house prices that is statistically significant at the 10% 
level in all specifications except for column 3. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates is 
slightly smaller in the CBSA level analysis. The estimate in column 2 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in foreclosures per homeowner leads to a 1/3 standard deviation lower house 
price growth.17 
C. Analysis of Zip Codes Near the Border for House Price Effect 
 In this section, we examine house price growth patterns in zip codes that are near the 
border of two states with differing state laws. The first stage effect in Figure 4 (discussed above) 
shows a very sharp increase in foreclosures per delinquent account as one crosses the border 
from a judicial to a no judicial requirement state. What is the effect on house prices? 
 Even with the sharp discontinuity in foreclosures and a true effect of foreclosures on 
house prices, one would not expect a sharp discontinuity in house price growth around the 
                                                
17 The reduced form graphs in Figure 7 suggest a larger decline in house prices using the FCSW indices relative to 
Zillow, yet the 2SLS magnitudes for both indices are similar. This is driven by two effects. First, Figure 7 does not 
condition on delinquencies whereas the 2SLS specification does. Conditioning on delinquencies does not change the 
Zillow reduced form, but decreases the FCSW reduced form by about 25%. Second, the FCSW indices are only 
available for 24 states, and the first stage is stronger among these states. Given that the 2SLS estimate is based on 
the ratio of the reduced form coefficient to the first stage, the 2SLS estimate for FCSW is similar given the larger 
first stage. 
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border. The main reason is that housing markets are not sharply divided by a border between two 
states. If home-buyers view houses in zip codes across a state border as close substitutes, a 
foreclosure-induced drop in house prices on the non-judicial side of the border will have 
spillover effects onto the housing markets on the judicial side of the border. 
 The two panels of Figure 8 show this effect. The plots are for house price growth from 
2008 to 2009 for FCSW (left) and 2008 to 2009 for Zillow (right). The plots are created with the 
same estimation as in equation (1) of Section II. Both plots show a pattern that is consistent with 
higher foreclosures in the non-judicial state leading to lower house prices. As one goes from 25 
miles away from the border in the judicial state toward the border, house prices begin to drop 
reflecting the spillover from foreclosures on the other side of the border. There is some evidence 
of a sharp drop in house prices right at the border (although less clear using Zillow). House 
prices continue to decline as one goes further into the non-judicial state. 
 As a statistical test of the pattern in Figure 8, we test whether we can reject the hypothesis 
of equivalent house price growth in zip codes 10 miles on each side of the border. This translates 
to a test of whether the difference in the average of the coefficients on the mile indicator 
variables 10 miles within the non-judicial and 10 miles within the judicial is zero. We can reject 
this hypothesis at the 99% confidence level for the FCSW data, and at the 95% level for the 
Zillow house price data. Recall from Figure 5 that zip codes on either side of the border are 
similar on most other characteristics. 
 The spillover effects of housing markets on either side of the border prevents a traditional 
regression discontinuity approach for evaluating the effect of foreclosures on house prices. 
Nonetheless, the patterns in Figure 8 are consistent with the view that foreclosures are 
disproportionately affecting housing markets on the non-judicial side of the state border.  
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D. Timing of the House Price Decline 
 One final question regarding the effect of  foreclosures on house price growth is timing. 
As Figure 7 shows, house price growth in 2010 and 2011 was no different in judicial versus non-
judicial states. We also confirmed this result statistically in a two-stage least squares setting. 
There is no difference in house price growth despite the fact that the first stage continues to be 
strong in 2010 and 2011. 
 Foreclosure rates continue to be higher in 2010 and 2011 in non-judicial states but house 
prices do not further decline. Why? One possible interpretation of this result is based on 
expectations and the possible increase in house prices once the foreclosure wave dies down after 
2011. In particular, in order to absorb the sharp rise in foreclosures in non-judicial states, two 
incentives need to be given to potential buyers, (i) a reduction in price as reflected by the extra 
drop in house prices between 2007 and 2009, and (ii) the expectation of a larger price increases 
once the foreclosure wave passes and housing inventory returns to more normal levels.   
The lion's share of the aggregate rise in foreclosures occurred in 2008 and 2009 (see 
Figure 1), and market participants in non-judicial states may have fully incorporated both present 
and future higher foreclosure rates in non-judicial states into house prices as of the end of 2009. 
Further reduction in house prices is not needed to clear the continuing high level of foreclosures 
in 2010 and 2011 if the anticipation of higher prices once foreclosure wave passes keeps prices 
from dipping even further.  
IV. The Effect of Foreclosures on Residential Investment and Durable Consumption 
A. Two-stage least squares estimates 
The results in the above section document a large negative effect of foreclosures on house 
prices. A central idea in macroeconomic research is that a sharp negative movement in the 
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relative price of durable goods can amplify shocks and lead to a reduction in real economic 
activity. This section explores this idea in the context of residential investment and durable 
consumption. 
 Figure 9 presents the reduced form version of our two-stage least squares specification. 
The top panel plots residential investment growth in non-judicial and judicial states from 2004 to 
2010 as measured by new residential construction permits collected by the Census. The data used 
in the top panel are at the annual frequency.18 The top left graph is in natural log scale with the 
natural log of the level of residential investment in 2004Q1 subtracted from the series. 
 Residential investment patterns were similar through 2007, at which point there was a 
larger drop in residential investment in non-judicial states through 2009. The significance of the 
relative decline appears muted given the very large overall decrease in residential investment in 
all states. However, in the top right panel we show the difference between non-judicial and 
judicial states. Residential investment dropped by 8 percentage points more in non-judicial states 
relative to judicial states from 2007 to 2008 and remained significantly lower in 2009. There is 
some evidence of a relative rebound from 2009 to 2010 in non-judicial states, although it is not 
statistically significant. 
 The bottom panel of Figure 9 plots auto sales. It shows a smaller decline in auto sales in 
states that require judicial foreclosure. As the bottom right panel shows, auto sales in each 
quarter from 2008Q2 to 2010Q4 were 5 to 10% lower in non-judicial versus judicial states 
relative to their 2004Q1 respective values. It is important to note that both the residential 
                                                
18 Permits for new residential construction are available from the Census at a monthly frequency. However, there are 
two disadvantages with the monthly data. First, monthly data are available for only 2/3 of the underlying counties 
for which the annual data are available. Second, the seasonal pattern in residential construction is so strong that it is 
difficult to discern differences using data at a frequency less than annual. 
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investment and auto sales data are flows, not stocks. So the cumulative difference over 2008 and 
2009 in auto sales and residential investment between judicial and non-judicial states is large. 
 The first three columns of Table 8 present the state-level two-stage least squares 
estimates for residential investment as measured by new residential construction permits. The 
estimate in column 1 on foreclosures per homeowner implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in foreclosures leads to a 2/5 standard deviation decrease in residential investment 
growth from 2007 to 2009. Alternatively, moving from the median to the 90th percentile of the 
distribution of foreclosures leads to 23 percentage points lower residential investment growth 
from 2007 to 2009. The CBSA level estimates imply a similar magnitude. Both the state and 
CBSA level estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of the full set of control variables in column 
3, but the CBSA level results remain significant at the 12% confidence level. 
 Table 9 presents the corresponding results for auto sales. The estimate in column 2 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in foreclosures leads to a 3/5 standard deviation 
decrease in auto sales growth from 2007 to 2009. Alternatively, moving from the median to the 
90th percentile of the foreclosures distribution leads to 12 percentage points lower auto sales 
growth from 2007 to 2009.19 
B. Macroeconomic Implications 
 We can use the estimates obtained in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 to inform the debate regarding 
the effect of foreclosures on the macro-economy. However, it is critical to emphasize that the 
estimated marginal effects are driven by variation in foreclosures that comes from the judicial 
foreclosure requirement in certain states. Given that the local average treatment effect (LATE) is 
                                                
19 Unlike the house price data which are available at the zip code level, residential investment and auto sales data are 
only available at the county level. 
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driven by this very specific source of variation, we urge caution in using the full distribution of 
foreclosures to estimate aggregate impacts.20 
 Our strategy to estimate the aggregate effect of foreclosures relies only on the variation in 
foreclosures that is driven by the judicial foreclosure requirement. This corresponds to the first 
stage estimate of the effect of judicial foreclosure requirement on foreclosures that is reported in 
Table 2 for the state level data. The advantage of this approach is that it utilizes variation that can 
be explained with the first stage, and is therefore analogous to an “in-sample” treatment effect 
where judicial foreclosure requirement states represent the control group. The estimate is -0.024, 
which implies that foreclosures per homeowner are 2.4 percentage points lower in judicial 
foreclosure requirement states. 
 We multiply the foreclosure coefficient estimates in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 with the 2.4 
percentage point difference in foreclosure rates to estimate the aggregate impact of foreclosures 
on house prices, residential investment and auto sales. For house prices, the estimate in column 2 
of Table 6 implies that house price growth from 2007 to 2009 was (-1.4*-0.024 =) 3.4 percentage 
points lower in non-judicial versus judicial states. The average decline in the sample is 12 
percentage points, which implies that foreclosures can explain about 28% of the decline in house 
prices. The CBSA calculation leads to an estimate that foreclosures explain 22% of the decline. 
 For residential investment, the state-level estimate in column 2 of Table 8 suggests that 
residential investment growth from 2007 to 2009 was (-5.2*-0.024 =) 12 percentage points lower 
in non-judicial versus judicial states. The average decline in the sample is 77 percentage points, 
which implies that foreclosures can explain about 15% of the overall decline in residential 
investment. A similar calculation using the CBSA-level estimate in column 5 of Table 8 implies 
that foreclosures can explain 25% of the overall decline in residential investment. 
                                                
20 For more on this issue, see Chapter 4 of Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
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 For auto sales, the estimate in column 2 of Table 9 implies that auto sales growth from 
2007 to 2009 was (-3.3*-0.024 =) 8 percentage points lower in non-judicial versus judicial 
requirement states. The average decline in the sample (from Table 1) is 41 percentage points, 
which implies that foreclosures can explain about 20% of the overall decline in auto sales. Using 
the CBSA-level estimate in column 5 of Table 9 implies that foreclosures can explain 35% of the 
overall decline in auto sales from 2007 to 2009. 
 Overall, our analysis implies that foreclosures can explain 20 to 30% of the aggregate 
house price decline, 15 to 25% of the decline in residential investment from 2007 to 2009 and 20 
to 35% of the decline in auto sales over the same period. 
V. Further Robustness Checks 
Our results on the effect of foreclosures on house prices, residential investment and 
durable consumption are based on using state foreclosure laws as an instrument for foreclosures. 
We discussed a number of results that confirm the legitimacy of the instrument. First, both state 
level comparison and state-border discontinuity tests showed the strong impact that state laws 
have on foreclosure intensity. Second, the foreclosure law impact is persistent and lasts for at 
least five years - highlighting the scale of the mortgage default crisis. Third, despite stark 
differences in foreclosure intensity, judicial and non-judicial states are remarkably similar 
otherwise, providing support for the exclusion restriction. 
In this section we provide additional robustness checks regarding the validity of our 
empirical analysis. In the interest of brevity we only provide a brief summary of the robustness 
checks in this section, and relegate the details in the online appendix that accompanies this paper. 
A. Alternative Foreclosure and House Price Data 
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Our foreclosure data comes from RealtyTrac which is the primary source of foreclosure 
data in the country. An alternative possible source is data on foreclosure starts at the state level is 
from the Mortgage Bankers' Association (MBA). However, the MBA data are not well-suited for 
our analysis because they do not differentiate a foreclosure start from a foreclosure auction. The 
RealtyTrac data allow us to separate out the auction stage, which is the focus of our analysis here 
(see Appendix Table 1 for more details). 
We also report our house price results in Appendix Figure 1 using the publicly available 
FHFA house price data and the Case Shiller 20-city indices. Unlike the Zillow and FCSW data, 
these publicly available versions are available only at the CBSA (city) level. The results are 
similar using these two data sources. 
B. Ex-ante Credit Supply  
Perhaps the biggest concern for the exclusion restriction is the ex ante differential 
incentives of lenders to supply credit in judicial versus non-judicial states. Given that lenders can 
more easily foreclose on collateral in non-judicial states, they should be more willing to supply 
credit for borrowers in those states. A potential concern is that the higher credit supply during the 
housing boom in non-judicial states is responsible for the outcomes we find. Support for this 
concern comes from Pence (2006), who uses a census tract border discontinuity design in 1994 
and 1995 data and finds that individual mortgages are 3 to 7% smaller in judicial versus non-
judicial states (see also Benmelech, et al (2005) on commercial mortgages). 
We explore this concern using the border sample, which is similar to the strategy used in 
Pence (2006). In Appendix Table 2 we show that during the 1990s there is some evidence of 
higher credit supply to states with no judicial foreclosure requirement. But by the late 1990s into 
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the 2000s, there is no evidence that lenders were willing to lend higher amounts in states with no 
judicial foreclosure requirement.  
Why does the Pence (2006) result weaken over time? Why did lenders from 2000 to 2005 
not extend more credit to borrowers in non-judicial states where the costs of foreclosure are 
lower? One reason is that, during the housing boom, lenders and intermediaries assigned a very 
low probability to states of the world in which house prices declined substantially (Gerardi, et al 
(2008)). If lenders assign a very low probability to default states, then the loss given default 
would play a negligible role in lending decisions.  
Another reason is lack of due diligence by purchasers of securitized mortgage backed 
securities, who may not have fully understood the ex post differences in foreclosure rates across 
states. Related, most of the loans originated in general, i.e. the conforming loans, are guaranteed 
by the GSEs against default. There is no evidence that GSE insurance premiums differ by the 
foreclosure laws in a given state. As a result, originators would be indifferent between judicial 
and non-judicial states when it comes to evaluating the loss given default in different states. 
Finally, we find that the ease of foreclosure leads to larger price declines. If banks ex-
ante understand this general equilibrium effect of forced sales, they will weigh the ease with 
which they can grab the delinquent home against the lower price they get in the event of a sale.21 
The net effect of these two forces may be neutral. 
C. Other State Laws 
One concern with regard to the exclusion restriction is whether other laws related to 
foreclosures are correlated with the judicial versus non-judicial difference, and whether these 
other laws are responsible for our results. In Appendix Table 3, we examine this issue in detail 
                                                
21 The house price drop due to foreclosures is an externality from the perspective of the individual decision of a bank 
to foreclose or not. Therefore, in the event of default, ex-post competition across banks will lead them to foreclose 
without internalizing the impact on house prices.  
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and find that the difference in foreclosure rates across judicial and non-judicial states is robust to 
the consideration of other laws such as the right to cure, deficiency judgment rules and others.  
D. Alternative State Foreclosure Law Classifications 
We use of RealtyTrac's classification of judicial versus non-judicial states and discuss 
reasons for doing so in section II. However, there are some disagreements concerning 
RealtyTrac’s definition. In particular, RealtyTrac classifies Massachusetts as a judicial state but 
other sources count it as a non-judicial state. We explore this issue at length in the appendix (see 
discussion of Appendix Tables 4-5, and Appendix Figures 2 in the online appendix). We discuss 
why RealtyTrac lists Massachusetts as a non-judicial state, justify the classification based on the 
data, and show that the results are similar if we switch Massachusetts to be classified as a state 
with no judicial requirement. 
E. House Price Effect and Strategic Default  
 We show in Section II that mortgage defaults in 2008 and 2009 are similar in both 
judicial and non-judicial states. We also show that non-judicial state experience a larger decline 
in house prices due to higher rate of foreclosures. If house prices drop further in non-judicial 
states, then more households are likely to be underwater and therefore susceptible to strategic 
default on their mortgages. Is there any evidence of this in the data? Our default rate data runs 
until the end of 2011, and until the end of 2011 there is no significant difference in default rates 
between judicial and non-judicial states.  
 What explains the lack of difference in default rates despite the steeper house price 
declines in non-judicial states? An important offsetting effect is that households in non-judicial 
states may be less willing to strategically default because of the ease of foreclosure. Evidence 
supporting this view comes from the most recent 2011Q4 report from CoreLogic on negative 
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equity. It shows that mortgages in non-judicial states were more likely to be underwater. In 
particular, CoreLogic reports that 20.5% of mortgages are underwater or near underwater in 
judicial states while 25.7% of mortgages are underwater or near underwater in non-judicial 
states. 
 There is therefore a larger number of people in non-judicial states who continue to 
service their mortgages despite being underwater. It is likely that these two effects--non-judicial 
states see sharper price declines but higher penalties from delinquency--offset one another and 
lead to similar delinquency rates in judicial and non-judicial states.  
F. Other Robustness Checks 
 We also perform the following additional robustness checks. First, Appendix Table 6 
shows that our core results are robust to the exclusion of the two states with the highest 
foreclosure rates (Arizona and Nevada). Second, Appendix Table 7 shows that we do not see a 
similar reduction in real economic activity in states with no judicial requirement during the 2001 
recession when foreclosures were negligible. This latter test refutes the hypothesis that states 
with no judicial requirement are inherently more cyclical or prone to boom-bust cycles. 
 Third, we test if higher mobility out of non-judicial states explains the drop in real 
activity in these areas. It turns out this is not the case. In particular, while it is true that MSAs 
which experienced large declines in house prices experienced a reduction in the average 
likelihood of staying in the same house, the drop is driven by people who moved but remained in 
the same county. We perform this test using individual level data first used in Mian and Sufi 
(2011) that tracks individual mobility. Thus our state level analysis on real outcomes is 
unaffected by mobility concerns. 
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Fourth we assessed the issue of possible weakness of our instrumental variable. In 
general we observe F statistics above Stock and Yogo (2005) weak identification critical values, 
rejecting the hypothesis that the IV is weak. We also verified that all our results were robust to 
weak instruments by employing the approach in Moreira (2003, 2009), which produces tests and 
confidence sets with correct size when instruments are arbitrarily weak for the just-identified 
case of a single endogenous variable. 
VI. Conclusion 
A large body of theoretical research in macroeconomics emphasizes how the leverage-
induced forced sale of durable goods can (1) lead to negative price effects and (2) reduce 
economic output. Many academics, policy-makers, and regulators have emphasized these models 
in building an understanding of the recession of 2007 to 2009. Yet, to our knowledge, there is 
limited empirical evidence that directly links a specific financial friction to the real economy. 
 We bridge this gap by examining the price and real effects of foreclosures using variation 
in state-specific laws as an instrument. We find that foreclosure-induced increase in the supply of 
houses for sale has a large negative impact on house prices. The drop in housing wealth 
generates further drops in durable consumption and residential investment. Our findings suggest 
that foreclosures may have been an important factor in explaining the length and depth of the 
recession of 2007 to 2009.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the state and CBSA level data used in the analysis. Foreclosures are 
measured by RealtyTrac.com as new foreclosure filings. Delinquencies represent the number of delinquent accounts 
60 days past due as measured by Equifax. The scalar homeowner represents the number of mortgage accounts as of 
2005 as measured by Equifax. Subprime consumer fraction is the fraction of consumers with a credit score less than 
660 as measured by Equifax. Residential permits represent the value of permits for new residential construction as 
measured by the Census. Auto sales are measured by R.L. Polk. 
       
 N Mean SD 10th 50th 90th 
State level data       
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008 and 2009 51 0.037 0.034 0.009 0.030 0.071 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 2008 and 2009 51 0.095 0.042 0.058 0.086 0.133 
Zillow house price growth, 2002 to 2006 45 0.326 0.163 0.133 0.330 0.588 
Zillow house price growth, 2006 to 2007 47 -0.018 0.047 -0.083 -0.014 0.041 
Zillow house price growth, 2007 to 2009 48 -0.119 0.126 -0.268 -0.091 0.012 
FCSW house price growth, 2002 to 2006 24 0.364 0.199 0.094 0.347 0.674 
FCSW house price growth, 2006 to 2007 24 -0.070 0.069 -0.194 -0.049 -0.002 
FCSW house price growth, 2007 to 2009 24 -0.205 0.162 -0.475 -0.177 -0.065 
Residential permits growth, 2002 to 2006 51 0.289 0.275 -0.071 0.245 0.656 
Residential permits growth, 2006 to 2007 51 -0.198 0.141 -0.339 -0.191 -0.037 
Residential permits growth, 2007 to 2009 51 -0.768 0.270 -1.082 -0.726 -0.496 
Auto sales growth, 2004 to 2006 51 -0.020 0.123 -0.116 -0.046 0.093 
Auto sales growth, 2006 to 2007 51 -0.022 0.056 -0.104 -0.019 0.050 
Auto sales growth, 2007 to 2009 51 -0.413 0.157 -0.578 -0.399 -0.238 
       
CBSA level data       
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008 and 2009 958 0.029 0.032 0.003 0.020 0.063 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 2008 and 2009 958 0.092 0.044 0.050 0.083 0.140 
Zillow house price growth, 2002 to 2006 339 0.349 0.195 0.106 0.338 0.611 
Zillow house price growth, 2006 to 2007 356 -0.028 0.090 -0.147 -0.020 0.058 
Zillow house price growth, 2007 to 2009 364 -0.148 0.151 -0.341 -0.120 0.013 
FCSW house price growth, 2002 to 2006 121 0.387 0.213 0.094 0.396 0.676 
FCSW house price growth, 2006 to 2007 120 -0.098 0.112 -0.249 -0.060 0.009 
FCSW house price growth, 2007 to 2009 120 -0.201 0.159 -0.444 -0.160 -0.039 
Residential permits growth, 2002 to 2006 946 0.317 0.567 -0.311 0.281 1.010 
Residential permits growth, 2006 to 2007 947 -0.159 0.442 -0.559 -0.179 0.264 
Residential permits growth, 2007 to 2009 945 -0.771 0.517 -1.480 -0.757 -0.138 
Auto sales growth, 2002 to 2006 958 -0.049 0.121 -0.170 -0.060 0.079 
Auto sales growth, 2006 to 2007 958 -0.024 0.080 -0.125 -0.020 0.072 
Auto sales growth, 2007 to 2009 958 -0.420 0.153 -0.624 -0.413 -0.227 
New mortgages/income, 2005 958 0.113 0.094 0.038 0.082 0.235 
Debt to income increase, 2002 to 2005 958 0.193 0.325 -0.087 0.190 0.481 
Subprime consumer fraction, 2000  958 0.343 0.094 0.236 0.328 0.474 
Ln(Income, 2005) 958 3.757 0.215 3.542 3.722 4.015 
Fraction with income less than 25K, 2005 958 0.470 0.062 0.401 0.469 0.540 
Unemployment rate, 2000 958 0.061 0.022 0.038 0.057 0.089 
Poverty fraction, 2000 958 0.138 0.056 0.079 0.128 0.211 
Black fraction, 2000 958 0.084 0.121 0.002 0.028 0.276 
Hispanic fraction, 2000 958 0.060 0.120 0.005 0.019 0.140 
Less than high school education fraction, 2000 958 0.210 0.077 0.127 0.194 0.320 
Urban fraction, 2000 958 0.617 0.188 0.362 0.612 0.881 
       
 
Table 2 
Judicial Foreclosure Requirement Instrument 
Panel A presents coefficients from the first stage regression of foreclosures during 2008 and 2009 on whether a state 
requires a judicial foreclosure. Panel B repeats the first stage regression separately for each year from 2006 through 
2011. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Panel A: First Stage
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Foreclosures 
per homeowner 
08-09 
Delinquencies 
per homeowner 
08-09 
Foreclosures 
per homeowner 
08-09 
Foreclosures per 
delinquency 
08-09 
     
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.024** -0.004 -0.021** -0.192** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.038) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09   0.618**  
   (0.109)  
Constant 0.047** 0.096** -0.013 0.384** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.032) 
N 51 51 51 51 
R2 0.121 0.003 0.700 0.286 
     
Panel B: First Stage By Year
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Foreclosure per homeowner in Year: 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.003* -0.005** -0.009** -0.013** -0.013** -0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Delinquencies per homeowner 0.226** 0.326** 0.416** 0.407** 0.436** 0.314** 
 (0.063) (0.069) (0.094) (0.068) (0.057) (0.099) 
Constant -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R2 0.429 0.467 0.6 0.717 0.689 0.495 
       
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
  
Table 3 
Are Judicial Foreclosure Law States Different? 
Each row of the table represents an univariate regression of the variable in the first column on whether a state 
requires a judicial foreclosure. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
 
 Judicial foreclosure 
requirement 
N R2   
      
Delinquencies per homeowner, 06 0.0014 51 0.003   
 (0.004)     
Delinquencies per homeowner, 09 -0.0028 51 0.001   
 (0.010)     
Log Zillow house price, 2005 -0.0023 47 0.00   
 (0.13)     
Zillow house price growth, 2002 to 2005 -0.001 45 0.000   
 (0.051)     
FCSW house price growth, 2002 to 2005 0.049 24 0.018   
 (0.073)     
Debt to income increase, 2002 to 2005 -0.026 51 0.007   
 (0.042)     
Subprime consumer fraction, 2000  -0.0161 51 0.014   
 (0.018)     
Ln(Income, 2005) 0.0332 51 0.010   
 (0.050)     
Fraction with income less than 25K, 2005 -0.0046 51 0.003   
 (0.012)     
Unemployment rate, 2000 -0.0046 51 0.029   
 (0.004)     
Poverty fraction, 2000 -0.0078 51 0.014   
 (0.009)     
Black fraction, 2000 0.0103 51 0.002   
 (0.030)     
Hispanic fraction, 2000 0.0050 51 0.001   
 (0.021)     
Less than high school education fraction, 2000 0.0013 51 0.000   
 (0.012)     
Urban fraction, 2000 0.0266 51 0.007   
 (0.046)     
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
Table 4 
List of Borders of States with Different Foreclosure Rules 
This table shows the borders of states where the judicial foreclosure requirement laws differ. It also shows the 
number of zip codes in the sample that are near those borders. 
 Number of zip codes 
 Within 50 miles 
of border 
Within 25 miles 
of border 
Within 10 miles 
of border 
 State Border    
1 AL-FL 182 94 41 
2 AR-LA 103 57 28 
3 AZ-NM 85 53 12 
4 CO-KS 47 27 11 
5 CO-NE 68 31 14 
6 CO-NM 93 48 12 
7 CT-RI 150 82 40 
8 DC-MD 215 128 64 
9 FL-GA 199 101 30 
10 GA-SC 308 170 77 
11 IA-IL 353 192 85 
12 IA-NE 301 167 83 
13 IL-MO 556 345 176 
14 IL-WI 371 162 70 
15 IN-MI 268 140 50 
16 KS-MO 415 252 131 
17 KS-OK 269 124 56 
18 KY-MO 62 38 14 
19 KY-TN 467 198 77 
20 KY-VA 239 165 78 
21 KY-WV 286 172 66 
22 LA-MS 354 139 51 
23 LA-TX 234 115 40 
24 MA-NH 295 226 88 
25 MA-RI 277 201 83 
26 MD-VA 487 321 166 
27 MD-WV 152 114 70 
28 ME-NH 200 124 63 
29 MI-OH 337 134 56 
30 MN-ND 201 110 50 
31 MO-NE 41 25 11 
32 MT-ND 53 28 10 
33 NC-SC 458 253 115 
34 ND-SD 134 64 30 
35 NE-SD 171 97 47 
36 NE-WY 37 21 5 
37 NH-VT 300 206 99 
38 NM-TX 145 89 38 
39 OH-WV 496 251 136 
40 PA-WV 565 246 72 
 Total 9,974 5,510 2,445 
  
Table 5 
Foreclosures and New for Sale Listings 
Panel A presents test for discontinuity in foreclosure rate at the state border using zip code level data. Distance is 
define in miles divided by 1,000 from the border and is multiplied by -1 for judicial states. Column 1 of Panel B 
presents the reduced form relation between the judicial foreclosure requirement and new for sale listings. Columns 2 
and 3 present coefficients of the second stage of a 2SLS specification of the number of new for sale listings on 
foreclosures. The first stage regresses foreclosures on whether a state has a judicial foreclosure requirement. The 
right hand side variables are measured as of the same year as the left hand side. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the state-
border discontinuity test for new listings per homeowner. Standard errors for all zip code level regressions are 
clustered at the state-border level (40 clusters in total).
Panel A: Foreclosure State-Border Discontinuity Test
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Foreclosure per delinquent mortgage in Year: 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.079 -0.153* -0.200* -0.150** -0.184** -0.183** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.080) (0.049) (0.056) (0.066) 
Distance -1.548 -2.289 -3.217 -1.607 -2.857+ -0.847 
 (1.529) (2.253) (2.214) (1.468) (1.683) (1.843) 
Distance Squared -2.306 -15.547 -22.851 -21.233 -19.518 -8.542 
 (20.257) (27.621) (25.572) (14.696) (18.335) (14.120) 
Distance Cubed 202.609 299.474 360.832 188.935 639.149 -63.303 
 (636.396) (1106.476) (1114.953) (537.227) (672.016) (695.386) 
State-Border * 10-mile Strips FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
N 4,918 5,314 5,638 6,036 5,987 5,831 
R2 0.438 0.419 0.388 0.418 0.45 0.515 
       
     
Panel B: New For Sale Listings
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 New for sale listings per homeowner in Year: 
 2009 and 2010 2009 2010  
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.013+   -0.019** -0.016**  
 (0.007)   (0.004) (0.005)  
Foreclosures per homeowner  0.457* 0.446*    
  (0.182) (0.191)    
Delinquencies per homeowner   0.107    
   (0.206)    
Constant 0.116** 0.091** 0.083**    
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)    
Distance    -0.132 -0.192  
    (0.181) (0.223)  
Distance Squared    -2.903 -1.306  
    (2.973) (2.677)  
Distance Cubed    27.679 -1.871  
    (109.898) (120.909)  
State-Border * 10-mile Strips FE    Yes Yes  
 51 51 51 8,235 8,235  
N 0.063 0.433 0.458 0.327 0.313  
R2       
       
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
 
 Table 6 
Foreclosures and House Prices, State-Level 2SLS 
This table presents coefficients of the second stage of a 2SLS specification of house price growth on foreclosures. 
The first stage, reported in Table 2, regresses foreclosures on whether a state has a judicial foreclosure requirement. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
       
 Zillow house price growth, 07-09 FCSW house price growth, 07-09 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Foreclosures per homeowner, 08-09 -1.904* -1.446* -1.685* -1.860* -1.351+ -5.429 
 (0.859) (0.635) (0.721) (0.873) (0.713) (4.117) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09 -1.188* -0.512 -0.741 -1.402* -0.143 6.837 
 (0.582) (0.533) (1.531) (0.594) (0.584) (12.365) 
House price growth, 02-06  -0.141+ -0.230*  -0.133 -0.436 
  (0.081) (0.098)  (0.105) (0.441) 
House price growth, 06-07  0.931** 0.437  1.175* 1.341 
  (0.231) (0.296)  (0.583) (1.494) 
Delinquencies squared, 08-09   0.645   -12.758 
   (4.034)   (28.174) 
New mortgages/income, 2005   0.135   0.696 
   (0.335)   (1.790) 
Debt to income increase, 02-05   -0.072   -0.207 
   (0.097)   (0.319) 
Subprime consumer fraction, 2000    -0.137   -0.617 
   (0.261)   (1.120) 
Income, 2005   0.052   -0.798 
   (0.122)   (0.506) 
income < 25K fraction, 2005   -0.172   -4.635 
   (0.535)   (3.117) 
Unemployment rate, 2000   0.139   -6.050+ 
   (1.581)   (3.105) 
Poverty fraction, 2000   1.144   3.298* 
   (0.790)   (1.486) 
Black fraction, 2000   0.055   -0.460 
   (0.123)   (0.590) 
Hispanic fraction, 2000   -0.080   1.007 
   (0.179)   (1.265) 
< high school education fraction, 2000   0.025   1.324 
   (0.330)   (1.248) 
Urban fraction, 2000   -0.149+   -0.196 
   (0.082)   (0.343) 
Constant 0.067* 0.049+ -0.039 0.048 0.011 4.892+ 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.653) (0.038) (0.046) (2.946) 
N 48 45 45 24 24 24 
R2 0.677 0.806 0.868 0.750 0.836 0.822 
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
  
Table 7 
Foreclosures and House Prices, CBSA-Level 2SLS 
This table presents coefficients of the second stage of a 2SLS specification of house price growth on foreclosures. 
The first stage regresses foreclosures on whether a state has a judicial foreclosure requirement. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the state level. 
       
 Zillow house price growth, 07-09 FCSW house price growth, 07-09 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Foreclosures per homeowner, 08-09 -1.196+ -1.403** -0.864 -1.562+ -1.185+ -2.959* 
 (0.656) (0.533) (0.656) (0.930) (0.697) (1.285) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09 -1.397** -1.033** -1.836** -1.055+ -0.524+ -0.286 
 (0.321) (0.276) (0.514) (0.584) (0.313) (0.798) 
House price growth, 02-06  -0.223** -0.146**  -0.199* -0.403** 
  (0.043) (0.047)  (0.086) (0.085) 
House price growth, 06-07  -0.139 -0.359**  0.282* 0.126 
  (0.098) (0.067)  (0.141) (0.222) 
Delinquencies squared, 08-09   1.572+   0.190 
   (0.951)   (1.510) 
New mortgages/income, 2005   -0.321**   0.472* 
   (0.120)   (0.237) 
Debt to income increase, 02-05   -0.087**   -0.097+ 
   (0.018)   (0.056) 
Subprime consumer fraction, 2000    0.414**   0.047 
   (0.149)   (0.375) 
Income, 2005   -0.099*   -0.242** 
   (0.042)   (0.081) 
income < 25K fraction, 2005   -0.124   -1.059* 
   (0.228)   (0.520) 
Unemployment rate, 2000   0.105   -0.443 
   (0.422)   (0.748) 
Poverty fraction, 2000   -0.337   1.202* 
   (0.334)   (0.602) 
Black fraction, 2000   0.053   -0.182 
   (0.093)   (0.293) 
Hispanic fraction, 2000   0.142*   0.059 
   (0.062)   (0.118) 
< high school education fraction, 2000   -0.341*   0.297 
   (0.157)   (0.233) 
Urban fraction, 2000   0.053+   0.108 
   (0.030)   (0.074) 
Constant 0.057** 0.097** 0.536* 0.021 0.037 1.259** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.210) (0.036) (0.035) (0.438) 
N 364 339 339 120 120 120 
R2 0.597 0.677 0.769 0.693 0.771 0.796 
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
  
Table 8 
Foreclosures and Residential Investment, 2SLS 
This table presents coefficients of the second stage of a 2SLS specification of residential investment growth on 
foreclosures. The first stage regresses foreclosures on whether a state has a judicial foreclosure requirement. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard errors in columns 4 through 6 are clustered at the state level. 
       
 Residential Permits Growth, 2007 to 2009 
 State-level 2SLS CBSA-level 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Foreclosures per homeowner, 08-09 -5.841* -5.239* -2.351 -8.951* -7.753+ -7.159 
 (2.590) (2.384) (2.875) (4.294) (4.137) (4.521) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09 -0.515 -0.948 -10.905* 0.927 -0.323 -2.608 
 (1.672) (1.499) (4.094) (1.987) (1.927) (2.011) 
Residential permits growth, 02-06  -0.100 -0.209  -0.075* -0.064 
  (0.106) (0.227)  (0.034) (0.046) 
Residential permits growth, 06-07  -0.060 -0.146  -0.374** -0.369** 
  (0.188) (0.248)  (0.062) (0.067) 
Delinquencies squared, 08-09   27.705*   7.144 
   (12.090)   (5.427) 
New mortgages/income, 2005   -0.447   -0.378 
   (1.058)   (0.558) 
Debt to income increase, 02-05   -0.085   0.084 
   (0.391)   (0.056) 
Subprime consumer fraction, 2000    -0.481   0.588 
   (1.482)   (0.399) 
Income, 2005   -0.413   -0.437* 
   (0.576)   (0.194) 
income < 25K fraction, 2005   -1.546   0.110 
   (3.287)   (0.899) 
Unemployment rate, 2000   -6.740   0.258 
   (4.571)   (1.513) 
Poverty fraction, 2000   3.947   -0.818 
   (3.575)   (0.696) 
Black fraction, 2000   0.898   -0.198 
   (0.662)   (0.263) 
Hispanic fraction, 2000   0.314   0.089 
   (0.786)   (0.270) 
< high school education fraction, 2000   -0.309   -0.325 
   (1.673)   (0.542) 
Urban fraction, 2000   0.427   0.471** 
   (0.261)   (0.135) 
Constant -0.501** -0.465** 2.188 -0.595** -0.551** 0.865 
 (0.082) (0.074) (3.519) (0.080) (0.078) (0.972) 
N 51 51 51 945 943 943 
R2 0.464 0.491 0.623 0.071 0.186 0.236 
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
  
Table 9 
Foreclosures and Durable Consumption, 2SLS 
This table presents coefficients of the second stage of a 2SLS specification of auto sales growth on foreclosures. The 
first stage regresses foreclosures on whether a state has a judicial foreclosure requirement. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard errors in columns 4 through 6 are clustered at the state level. 
       
 Auto Sales Growth, 2007 to 2009 
 State-level 2SLS CBSA-level 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Foreclosures per homeowner, 08-09 -2.906+ -3.310+ -3.756+ -7.105* -6.324* -4.946* 
 (1.559) (1.694) (2.135) (3.122) (2.485) (2.019) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09 -0.490 0.108 -2.226 1.774 1.385 0.351 
 (1.008) (1.037) (4.377) (1.475) (1.174) (0.877) 
Auto sales growth, 04-06  0.180 0.513**  -0.324* -0.202+ 
  (0.209) (0.135)  (0.149) (0.112) 
Auto sales growth, 06-07  0.700 0.636  -0.335* -0.079 
  (0.471) (0.486)  (0.139) (0.103) 
Delinquencies squared, 08-09   11.493   3.395+ 
   (11.124)   (1.832) 
New mortgages/income, 2005   -0.592   -0.049 
   (0.809)   (0.265) 
Debt to income increase, 02-05   0.423   0.039 
   (0.297)   (0.028) 
Subprime consumer fraction, 2000    -0.662   -0.246+ 
   (0.949)   (0.135) 
Income, 2005   -0.249   -0.140+ 
   (0.327)   (0.076) 
income < 25K fraction, 2005   -0.648   0.050 
   (1.835)   (0.343) 
Unemployment rate, 2000   1.169   0.204 
   (2.186)   (0.434) 
Poverty fraction, 2000   -0.086   -0.264 
   (1.726)   (0.231) 
Black fraction, 2000   0.365   -0.101 
   (0.396)   (0.100) 
Hispanic fraction, 2000   -0.107   -0.155+ 
   (0.476)   (0.081) 
< high school education fraction, 2000   0.479   -0.281+ 
   (1.054)   (0.161) 
Urban fraction, 2000   0.104   0.184** 
   (0.237)   (0.042) 
Constant -0.258** -0.280** 1.047 -0.376** -0.387** 0.218 
 (0.050) (0.050) (1.907) (0.054) (0.049) (0.383) 
N 51 51 51 958 958 958 
R2 0.378 0.425 0.584   0.222 
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
  
Figure 1 
Foreclosures, House Prices, Residential Investment, and Durable Consumption 
The top panel shows aggregate foreclosures from RealtyTrac.com and the household default rate from Equifax. 
House price growth in the bottom panel is from S&P/Case Shiller. 
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Figure 2 
States with Judicial Foreclosure Requirement 
States shaded in dark gray require judicial foreclosure. The data come from RealtyTrac.com and are available at: http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-
laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp 
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Figure 3 
The Effect of Judicial Foreclosure Requirement on Actual Foreclosures 
The left panel plots the foreclosures per delinquent account ratio for 2008 and 2009 by state. States that require a judicial foreclosure are shown in black. The 
middle panel plots foreclosures against delinquencies, where the sample is split by whether the state requires a judicial foreclosure. The right panel shows the 
first stage coefficients for state level regressions relating foreclosures per homeowner in a given year to whether the state requires judicial foreclosure. The 
regressions also include a control variable for delinquencies per homeowner. 
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Figure 4 
Foreclosures and Judicial Requirement: Zip Codes Near the Border Sample 
These figures plot averages of foreclosures near borders where the judicial requirement regime changes across states. We generate the graphs by regressing the 
variable of interest on state-border-group FE and on 1-mile band distance-to-the-border dummies (where the dummies are negative for judicial states) and then 
plot the coefficients on the distance-to-the-border dummies. The border is at 0, the omitted category. 
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Figure 5 
Other Variables and Judicial Requirement: Zip Codes Near the Border Sample 
These figures plot averages of variables near borders where the judicial requirement regime changes across states. 
We generate the graphs by regressing the variable of interest on state-border-group FE and on 1-mile band distance-
to-the-border dummies (where the dummies are negative for judicial states) and then plot the coefficients on the 
distance-to-the-border dummies. The border is at 0, the omitted category. 
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Figure 6 
New For Sale Listings: Zip Codes Near Border Sample 
The figure plots the number of houses newly listed for sale per homeowner in 2009 and 2010 for zip codes that are 
near borders where the judicial requirement regime changes across states. We generate the graphs by regressing the 
outcome variable on state-border-group FE and on 1-mile band distance-to-the-border dummies (where the dummies 
assume negative values for judicial states) and then plot the coefficients on the dummies. The border is at 0, the 
omitted category. 
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Figure 7 
Foreclosures and House Prices, Reduced Form 
The figures plots house price growth in judicial and non-judicial states from 2004 to 2011. The averages are weighted by total population. 
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Figure 8 
House Price Growth 2008-09: Zip Codes Near Border Sample 
The figure plots house price growth from 2008 to 2009 for zip codes that are near borders where the judicial 
requirement regime changes across states. We generate the graphs by regressing the outcome variable on state-
border-group FE and on 1-mile band distance-to-the-border dummies (where the dummies assume negative values 
for judicial states) and then plot the coefficients on the dummies. The border is at 0, the omitted category. 
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Figure 9 
Foreclosures, Residential Investment, and Durable Consumption, Reduced Form 
The figures plot residential investment (top) and auto sales (bottom) growth in judicial and non-judicial states from 2004 to 2010. The averages are weighted by 
total population. 
 
 
0
-
.
2
5
-
.
5
-
.
7
5
-
1
-
1
.
2
5
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
L
o
g
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
2
0
0
4
Q
1
 
S
u
b
t
r
a
c
t
e
d
2004 2006 2008 2010
No judicial requirement Judicial requirement
-
.
0
8
-
.
0
6
-
.
0
4
-
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
,
 
N
o
n
-
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
 
-
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
2004 2006 2008 2010
Difference, Non-judicial - Judicial
Residential Investment Growth
-
.
6
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
L
o
g
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
2
0
0
4
Q
1
 
S
u
b
t
r
a
c
t
e
d
2004q3 2006q1 2007q3 2009q1 2010q3
No judicial requirement Judicial requirement
-
.
1
-
.
0
5
0
.
0
5
.
1
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
,
 
N
o
n
-
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
 
-
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
2004q3 2006q1 2007q3 2009q1 2010q3
Difference, Non-judicial - Judicial
Auto Sales Growth
ONLINE APPENDIX 
"Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy" 
Atif Mian 
Amir Sufi 
Francesco Trebbi 
 
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION] 
 
Appendix Table 1: Addressing the Mortgage Bankers Association Data 
 
The Mortgage Bankers' Association makes available state by year data on foreclosure starts. The 
MBA leaves it to servicers to report whether they have initiated a foreclosure. However, the 
advice they provide is that a foreclosure start represents any time a servicer has made a decision 
that a foreclosure is going to be initiated either through a referral or a court filing. As a result, a 
foreclosure start in the MBA data will be very closely linked to the initial legal filing that begins 
the foreclosure process. 
 
It is crucial to understand that there are two stages of the foreclosure process: the pre-auction 
stage (a "notice of default" or "lis pendens" filing) and the auction stage (a "notice of trustee 
sale" filing or a "notice of foreclosure sale" filing). As explained in Section I, our analysis is 
focused on foreclosures at the auction stage where foreclosed homes come to the market. 
 
Unfortunately, the MBA data do not measure what is crucial for our analysis: when a home 
enters the auction stage of the foreclosure process. Instead, the MBA data are more accurate in 
measuring when the foreclosure process starts, which will often be when an initial pre-auction 
filing occurs. 
 
More specifically, in states where a pre-auction filing is required, the MBA data will report a 
foreclosure start before the auction stage that we would like to measure. It is for this reason the 
RealtyTrac data are so valuable. They allow us to measure when the foreclosure process reaches 
the auction stage. In general, the MBA data do not measure the relevant stage of foreclosure for 
our analysis. 
 
Further, this measurement problem means that one cannot use the MBA data to measure 
foreclosure auction differences across judicial and non-judicial states. Doing so leads to a 
mechanical and systematic bias. The reason is two-fold. First, all states that require a judicial 
foreclosure require a pre-auction filing. Of the 30 states that do not require a judicial foreclosure, 
16 do not require a pre-auction  filing. As a result, if one incorrectly uses the MBA data to 
measure foreclosure auctions, he would systematically and mechanically overstate the number of 
foreclosure auctions in judicial states relative to non-judicial states. Because many non-judicial 
states do not require a pre-auction filing, the MBA data will mechanically show lower 
foreclosure starts in non-judicial states. 
 
Second, even if all non-judicial states required a pre-auction filing, we know from Section I that 
foreclosures move from the pre-auction stage to the auction stage much more quickly in non-
judicial states. As a result, the foreclosure start data from the MBA for non-judicial states would 
more accurately reflect actual auctions, whereas they would systematically overstate auctions for 
judicial states. 
 
Appendix Table 1 shows evidence supporting the arguments above. In column 1, we repeat the 
first stage regression relating foreclosure auctions per homeowner in 2008 to the judicial 
requirement indicator variable. It shows the negative and statistically significant coefficient that 
is the basis of our empirical strategy. Column 2 reports the same specification but with the left 
hand side being pre-auction filings per homeowner as of 2008 according to RealtyTrac. It shows 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This reflects a mechanical result given that 16 
states with no judicial requirement do not require a pre-auction filing. In column 3 we exclude 
these 16 states and the coefficient is cut by 60% and is statistically insignificant. 
 
In column 4, we use as the left hand side variable foreclosure starts from the MBA, which is 
measured as a fraction of total mortgages serviced in their survey. It shows a coefficient of 0. 
This should not be surprising given the analysis above. The MBA data are measuring foreclosure 
starts and not foreclosure auctions. 
 
There is another implication of these facts that is worth mentioning: the foreclosure inventory 
data from the MBA--which measures foreclosures that have not yet reached the auction stage--
will also be mechanically higher for judicial states. This is because some non-judicial states do 
not require a pre-auction filing. For these non-judicial states, many foreclosures will never enter 
the MBA inventory because the first filing will be the auction filing. There is therefore higher 
inventory in judicial states, but this is mechanical. Alternatively, even in non-judicial states that 
require a pre-auction filing, we know that the total time from pre-auction filing to auction is 
faster in non-judicial states. Again, this will mean that there will be higher foreclosure inventory 
in judicial states at any point in time, as foreclosures leave the inventory after the auction. As a 
result, part of the MBA-measured higher foreclosure inventory in judicial states will be 
mechanical, and part will be a function of the faster time to foreclose in non-judicial states. 
 
Appendix Table 2: Ex Ante Credit Supply 
 
In Appendix Table 2, we report results from our estimation of the following equation: 
 
ܱݑݐܿ݋݉݁௭௕௦௫ ൌ ߙ௕௦௫ ൅ ߠ ∗ ܬݑ݈݀݅ܿ݅ܽܨ݋ݎ݈݁ܿ݋ݏݑݎܴ݁݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௦ ൅ ߟ௭௕௦௫    
 
where an outcome in zip code z near state border b in state s is regressed on a border-state-10-
mile strip fixed effect and the judicial foreclosure requirement indicator variable. In Panel A of 
Appendix Table 2, we first replicate the first stage where the outcome variable is the foreclosure 
rate. As column 1 shows, the foreclosure rate per homeowner is significantly lower in judicial 
states. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the state level evidence in Table 4. Column 2 
shows that the foreclosure per delinquency ratio is also much lower in zip codes on the judicial 
state side of the border. 
 
In column 3, we examine whether the average mortgage for home purchase in a zip code is 
smaller if the zip code is in a judicial state. This specification is similar to the one reported in 
Pence (2006) except we are using the average in a zip code instead of the underlying loans and 
we are examining the 2005 loans instead of 1994 and 1995 loans. The mortgage data come from 
HMDA. In column 4, we use an alternative left hand side variable, which is the total amount of 
mortgages for home purchase in a zip code scaled by total income from the IRS in that zip code. 
As the estimates in columns 3 and 4 show, we find no evidence that average loan sizes or total 
lending are significantly lower in judicial states, despite the fact that ex post foreclosure rates are 
significantly lower. The standard errors are sufficiently small that we can reject at the 10% level 
the hypothesis that loans sizes or loans to income are 3/4 standard deviation lower in zip codes 
on the judicial state side of the border. 
 
To further explore this issue, Panel B presents the same coefficients as in columns 3 and 4 but 
for every year going back to 1992. While statistical power is clearly an issue, we find very 
similar point estimates as Pence (2006) in the early part of the sample: lenders extended smaller 
and fewer loans to zip codes in judicial states. However, beginning in the middle 1990s and 
lasting throughout the housing boom, the coefficient estimates move toward zero and then turn 
positive. In other words, lenders during the housing boom did not take into account the ex post 
differences in foreclosure rates between judicial and non-judicial states. 
 
We also isolate the sample to loans that were not sold to GSEs given the argument that GSEs 
may not discriminate between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states. The results are similar. 
The standard errors across all specifications are small enough that we can reject at the 10% level 
of confidence that lenders extended loan amounts or loan sizes to judicial states in any year from 
2000 to 2004 that were 1/2 standard deviation lower than non-judicial states. 
 
We conclude based on this evidence that there is no differential credit supply effect in non-
judicial versus judicial states in the years before the foreclosure crisis. 
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Other state-level foreclosure and delinquency laws 
 
State laws requiring foreclosures to take place through courts are only one of many legal 
differences in mortgage markets across states. To assess the importance of the additional legal 
differences, we employ the Rao and Walsh (2009) taxonomy of consumer protection clauses 
included in state foreclosure statutes.1 Our goal is to examine whether other legal differences are 
(1) responsible for our results on judicial foreclosure requirement and (2) important in their own 
right. 
 
Rao and Walsh (2009) list the following six pre-sale protections: Access to court review; loss 
mitigation requirement before foreclosure; right to cure before acceleration; right to reinstate 
before sale; personal service requirement for complaint or sale notice; and housing emergency 
assistance fund. They also list four common post-sale protections: Right to redeem; deficiency 
judgments; accounting of sale proceeds; prompt return of surplus. While some of these 
dimensions correlate quite highly with judicial foreclosures (access to court review has a positive 
correlation of 69%), others display almost no correlation (right to reinstate before sale has a 
negative correlation of -1%). 
 
                                                            
1 We thank Christopher James for pointing us in this direction. 
In regressions some of which are reported in Appendix Table 3, we estimate augmented versions 
of the four main specifications in the top panel of Table 4. We regress the outcomes of interest 
on an indicator variable for whether the state requires judicial foreclosure with the addition of a 
discrete control variable taking value 1 if any of the ten consumer protection clauses in Rao and 
Walsh (2009) is present in a strong form, 1/2 if present but weak, and 0 if missing. We add each 
clause individually to the specification and the whole set of ten clauses simultaneously. This 
latter case is reported in the appendix. 
 
Examining the foreclosure per homeowner ratio in 2008 and 2009, the judicial foreclosure 
indicator maintains its original size and significance in each of the ten augmented specifications 
and in the specification with all clauses simultaneously (column 1). Foreclosure rates appear 
significantly lower in judicial foreclosure states. The judicial foreclosure variable eliminates the 
statistical significance of all of the other Rao and Walsh (2009) clauses except for the “right to 
redeem.” The results are similar if we control for delinquencies per homeowner in 2008 and 
2009 and when the left-hand-side variable is the foreclosure per delinquency ratio in 2008 and 
2009.  
 
Mortgage delinquencies do not display a correlation with whether states require judicial 
foreclosure, and they also display no strong correlation with any of the ten consumer protection 
clauses in Rao and Walsh (2009). We are unable to reject at the 10% level the hypothesis that 
delinquencies per homeowner are significantly different along any of these ten legal dimensions. 
In sum, we find that the judicial foreclosure requirement is the most relevant legal difference for 
explaining foreclosure rates and we find no evidence that any other legal difference is polluting 
our first stage estimate. 
 
 
Appendix Tables 4-5, Appendix Figure 2: The Classification of Massachusetts 
 
RealtyTrac classifies Massachusetts as a state that requires judicial approval for a foreclosure. 
Their justification for this classification is as follows: 
 
"While Massachusetts provides for a non-judicial foreclosure, prior to sale, an action must be 
filed with the Land Court to obtain a judgment that the owners of the subject property are not 
protected under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended.  A complaint is 
filed with the Land Court and the court provides an Order of Notice which must be served, 
published and recorded prior to judgment entering." 
 
The foreclosure rate evidence strongly supports the view that foreclosures in Massachusetts take 
more time and are less likely than in other non-judicial states in the region. There are two states 
that border Massachusetts (New Hampshire and Rhode Island) that are unambiguously states that 
do not have a judicial foreclosure requirement. According to RealtyTrac, the period of time it 
takes to conduct a foreclosure is longer in Massachusetts than in either New Hampshire or Rhode 
Island. 
 
In Appendix Table 4 Panel A, we show using our data that foreclosure rates per homeowner are 
in fact significantly lower in Massachusetts than in New Hampshire and Rhode Island, two states 
that unambiguously do not require a legal filing for foreclosure. Massachusetts has a foreclosure 
rate per homeowner that is 2.5% compared to 3.6% in New Hampshire and 4.5% in Rhode 
Island. In fact, New Hampshire has a lower number of delinquencies than Massachusetts despite 
having a higher number of foreclosures. The pass-through rate to foreclosure is much lower in 
Massachusetts than in either New Hampshire or Rhode Island. 
 
In Panel B, we use zip codes in these three states to show that foreclosures per homeowner are 
statistically and economically significantly lower in Massachusetts than New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island. After conditioning on delinquencies and all control variables, Massachusetts 
continues to show a 1.3% lower rate of foreclosures per homeowner, which is over 1/3 the mean 
in the zip code level sample. 
 
Further, as columns 3 and 4 show, the rate of delinquencies is close to identical in the three 
states. So the evidence is incontrovertible that foreclosures are lower in Massachusetts than New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island, and this difference is not a function of delinquencies or a large set 
of control variables. It seems reasonable that the RealtyTrac classification is correct in that the 
legal filing requirement in Massachusetts is an impediment to a quick foreclosure. 
 
Regardless, in Appendix Table 5 we replicate the state level coefficients of the core results 
switching Massachusetts from a judicial to a non-judicial state. The results are largely similar. 
Appendix Figure 2 shows that the border sample first stage graphs look very similar even when 
classifying Massachusetts as a non-judicial state. 
 
In summary, the RealtyTrac classification of Massachusetts as a judicial requirement state is 
consistent with the lower foreclosure rate in Massachusetts relative to New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island. This lower foreclosure rate is not driven by delinquencies or other control 
variables. Further, our results are qualitatively similar even if we classify Massachusetts as a 
non-judicial state. 
 
 
Appendix Table 6: Exclusion of Arizona and Nevada 
 
Appendix Table 6 presents the main results of the paper with the exclusion of Arizona and 
Nevada. We exclude these two states because they have very high rates of foreclosure relative to 
other states. All results are materially unchanged. The only results that show some movement in 
the coefficients are the house price growth results using FCSW. Recall that FCSW is only 
available for 24 states in the sample, and so a reduction in the sample size of 2 is a significant 
reduction. 
 
 
Appendix Table 7: 2001 Placebo Test 
 
Appendix Table 7 presents the 2001 placebo test. The concern we are addressing is that non-
judicial states are inherently more cyclical and therefore more prone to booms and busts. We use 
the 2001 recession as a placebo test because we know that house price declines and foreclosures 
were largely absent relative to the 2007 to 2009 recession. As the results show, the reduced form 
relation between auto sales and residential investment growth and judicial foreclosure 
requirement is positive and significant during the 2007 and 2009 recession. But there is no 
correlation during the 2001 recession. The standard errors are small and we can reject at the 5% 
level of confidence the hypothesis that the coefficient is the same during the 2001 recession as 
the 2007 to 2009 recession. This placebo test mitigates the concern that states without a judicial 
requirement for foreclosure are inherently more cyclical. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1: S&P 17 and OFEHO 
 
Given that the zip code level FCSW and Zillow house price indices are not available for public 
use, in Appendix Figure 1 we replicate our findings using publicly available S&P/Case-Shiller 
and FHFA CBSA level data. For the S&P CS indices, we exclude three MSAs that cross the 
borders of states that differ in their judicial foreclosure requirement laws (Chicago, IL; Charlotte, 
NC; and Washington, DC). The relative drop in non-judicial states using the S&P CS publicly 
available data is 12%, and the relative drop using FHFA is 3%. FHFA data excludes non-
conforming (mostly subprime and jumbo loans) loans in its construction and hence tends to 
underestimate house price changes driven by the mortgage crisis. This figure corresponds with 
Figure 7 in the text. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Exploration of MBA foreclosure start data 
This table relates foreclosure filings as measured by RealtyTrac (RT) and the Mortgage Bankers' Association 
National Delinquency Survey to whether a state has a judicial requirement for foreclosure. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Foreclosure 
auction filings 
per homeowner, 
RT, 2008 
Foreclosure pre-
auction filings 
per homeowner, 
RT, 2008 
Foreclosure pre-
auction filings 
per homeowner, 
RT, 2008 
Foreclosure 
starts per 
mortgage, MBA, 
2008 
     
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.009** 0.005* 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 2008 0.416** 0.285** 0.356** 0.144** 
 (0.054) (0.038) (0.039) (0.009) 
Constant -0.004 -0.012** -0.014** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
     
Sample Full Full States requiring 
pre-auction 
filing 
Full 
     
N 51 51 35 51 
R2 0.600 0.563 0.725 0.838 
 
  
  
Appendix Table 2 
Ex Ante Credit Supply, Zip Codes Near Border Sample 
This table presents evidence on whether zip codes in judicial versus non-judicial states experience differential credit 
supply before the foreclosure crisis in 2008 and 2009. The sample for all specifications is the border discontinuity 
zip code sample, and all specifications include border-strip fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A replicate the 
first stage in the border discontinuity sample. Loan size is defined to be the average loan size of mortgages 
originated for the purpose of home purchase in a zip code. Loans to income is the total amount of mortgages 
originated for the purpose of home purchase scaled by total aggregate IRS income in the zip code. Non-GSE loans 
are mortgages that are not sold to a GSE within a year of origination. In Panel B, each coefficient is from a separate 
regression for the dependent variable in the column heading and the year in the row heading. Standard errors in all 
specifications are clustered at the border-strip level.
Panel A: First Stage and 2005 Credit Supply Measures
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Foreclosures 
per homeowner 
08-09 
Foreclosures per 
delinquency 
08-09 
Ln(loan size 05) Loans/Income, 
05 
     
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.021* -0.118* 0.045 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.052) (0.061) (0.019) 
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09 0.586**    
 (0.073)    
Constant -0.002 0.413** 5.101** 0.164** 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.035) (0.011) 
N 870 869 866 866 
R2 0.713 0.457 0.441 0.256 
     
Panel B: Coefficients by Year
 Ln(loan size) Loans/Income Non-GSE Loans/Income   
         
 Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error   
         
1992 -0.0381 (0.054) -0.0153 (0.010) -0.0069 (0.005)   
1993 -0.0365 (0.063) -0.0245 (0.019) -0.0079 (0.006)   
1994 -0.0262 (0.066) -0.0136 (0.018) -0.0048 (0.009)   
1995 -0.0012 (0.062) -0.0127 (0.016) -0.0061 (0.009)   
1996 0.0260 (0.074) -0.0106 (0.020) -0.0025 (0.011)   
1997 0.0245 (0.076) -0.0084 (0.020) -0.0017 (0.010)   
1998 0.0429 (0.071) -0.0083 (0.025) -0.0022 (0.012)   
1999 0.0576 (0.073) -0.0058 (0.022) 0.0004 (0.011)   
2000 0.0735 (0.072) -0.0031 (0.017) 0.0041 (0.010)   
2001 0.0841 (0.073) 0.0101 (0.015) 0.0073 (0.008)   
2002 0.0941 (0.084) 0.0100 (0.016) 0.0096 (0.009)   
2003 0.0546 (0.064) 0.0074 (0.015) 0.0067 (0.010)   
2004 0.0502 (0.054) 0.0088 (0.019) 0.0087 (0.016)   
2005 0.0452 (0.061) -0.0081 (0.019) -0.0060 (0.018)   
2006 0.0089 (0.056) -0.0125 (0.018) -0.0093 (0.015)   
2007 -0.0204 (0.051) -0.0064 (0.014) -0.0025 (0.010)   
      
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
  
 
Appendix Table 3 
Foreclosure Statutes in Detail 
The table presents coefficients from the first stage regression of foreclosures on whether a state requires a judicial 
foreclosure and all the consumer protection provisions reported in Rao and Walsh (2009). Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust. 
First Stage
 (1) (2) (3)  
 Foreclosures per 
homeowner 
08-09 
Foreclosures per 
delinquency 
08-09 
Delinquencies per 
homeowner 
08-09 
 
 
     
Judicial foreclosure requirement -0.020** -0.160** -0.006  
 (0.005) (0.049) (0.015)  
Delinquencies per homeowner, 08-09 0.625** 1.351*   
 (0.100) (0.517)   
Access to court review 0.008 0.071 -0.017  
 (0.006) (0.059) (0.013)  
Loss mitigation -0.004 0.014 0.064  
 (0.011) (0.096) (0.040)  
Right to cure -0.001 -0.054 -0.002  
 (0.007) (0.060) (0.025)  
Right to reinstate -0.004 0.023 0.007  
 (0.008) (0.059) (0.019)  
Personal service requirement -0.012 -0.092 -0.002  
 (0.008) (0.056) (0.013)  
Housing emergency fund 0.001 0.013 -0.023  
 (0.007) (0.060) (0.018)  
Right to redeem -0.013* -0.103+ -0.013  
 (0.006) (0.052) (0.019)  
Deficiency judgment  0.010 0.065 -0.014  
 (0.007) (0.060) (0.014)  
Accounting for sale proceeds 0.007 -0.014 0.015  
 (0.011) (0.084) (0.022)  
Prompt return of surplus -0.011 -0.078 0.004  
  (0.011) (0.083) (0.023)  
Constant -0.015 0.266** 0.102**  
 (0.010) (0.063) (0.011)  
N 51 51 51  
R2 0.748 0.517 0.163  
     
 
  
Appendix Table 4 
Foreclosures Lower in Massachusetts than New Hampshire and Rhode Island 
This table shows that foreclosure rates are lower in Massachusetts relative to New Hampshire and Rhode Island, the 
latter two being states in New England where foreclosures require no legal filings. Panel A shows the mean 
differences. Panel B shows the regression coefficient on a Massachusetts indicator variable for zip codes in these 
three states. Standard errors for the coefficients in Panel B are clustered at the state level.
Panel A: Foreclosure Rates in MA, NH, and RI
 (1) (2) (3)  
 Foreclosures per 
homeowner, 2008-
2009 
Delinquencies per 
homeowner, 2008-
2009 
Foreclosures per 
delinquency, 2008-
2009 
 
     
Massachusetts 0.025 0.079 0.251  
New Hampshire 0.036 0.070 0.413  
Rhode Island 0.045 0.096 0.345  
     
     
Panel B: Regression Coefficient on Massachusetts Indicator Variable in Zip Code Level Data
     
 Foreclosures per homeowner Delinquencies per homeowner  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
With all 
controls listed 
in Table 6, 
column 3  
With all 
controls listed 
in Table 6, 
column 3 
Massachusetts Indicator -0.015** -0.013* 0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Delinquencies per homeowner 0.337* 0.215*   
 (0.052) (0.007)   
Constant 0.015 -0.070+ 0.079** -0.043 
 (0.005) (0.022) (0.006) (0.127) 
N 791 629 792 629 
R2 0.41 0.76 0.00 0.60 
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
   
Appendix Table 5 
Results Switching Massachusetts to Non-Judicial State 
This table replicates the first and second specifications for each dependent variable (from Tables 6, 8, and 9) when 
switching Massachusetts to a non-judicial state.
 
 State level  
 Only Delinquency Control Delinquency and lagged 
dependent variable growth 
controls 
  
     
 Zillow house price growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -1.962* -1.423*   
 (0.866) (0.648)   
     
 FCSW house price growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -1.699* -1.159   
 (0.844) (0.774)   
     
 Permit growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -5.606* -5.089*   
 (2.598) (2.384)   
     
 Auto sales growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -2.574+ -2.842+   
 (1.529) (1.578)   
     
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Appendix Table 6 
Results without Arizona and Nevada 
This table replicates the first and second specifications for each dependent variable (from Tables 6, 8, and 9) after 
removing the two states (Arizona and Nevada) with the highest foreclosure rates.
 State level  
 Only Delinquency Control Delinquency and lagged 
dependent variable growth 
controls 
  
     
 Zillow house price growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -1.936+ -1.387+   
 (1.079) (0.789)   
     
 FCSW house price growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -1.599 -0.920   
 (1.283) (1.284)   
     
 Permit growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -6.689* -5.882+   
 (3.187) (3.032)   
     
 Auto sales growth, 2007 to 2009 
Foreclosures per homeowner, 2008-2009 -3.333+ -3.616+   
 (1.991) (1.953)   
     
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
   
Appendix Table 7 
2001 Recession Placebo Test 
This table presents the reduced form relation between permits and auto sales growth during the 2007 to 2009 
recession and the 2001 recession. The 2001 recession represents a placebo test because there were negligible 
foreclosures and house prices did not decline. All specifications include a control variable for household 
delinquencies per homeowner during the same time period as the left hand side variable.
Panel A: Residential permits
     
 Residential permits 
growth, 2007 to 2009 
Residential permits 
growth, 2000 to 2001 
Residential permits 
growth, 2000 to 2002 
     
Judicial foreclosure requirement 0.124* -0.009 -0.015  
 (0.058) (0.025) (0.041)  
     
N 51 51 51  
     
Panel B: Auto sales
     
 Auto sales growth, 
2007 to 2009 
Auto sales growth, 
2000 to 2001 
Auto sales growth, 
2000 to 2002 
     
Foreclosures per homeowner 0.062+ 0.015 0.005  
 (0.033) (0.014) (0.021)  
     
N 51 51 51  
**,*,+ Coefficient statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1 
Foreclosures and House Prices using Publicly Available Data, Reduced Form 
The figures plots house price growth in judicial and non-judicial states from 2004 to 2009. The averages are weighted by total population. 
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Appendix Figure 2 
Judicial Foreclosure Requirement and Actual Foreclosures 
Zip Codes Near Border Sample 
This figure replicates Figure 4 but with Massachusetts switched to a non-judicial state 
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